Game Theory in Canadian Politics (3)


HoserToHoosier offers the definitive look at the Harper/Ignatieff stand-off from a game theory perspective. Based on his assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium from the current conflict suggested a compromise (which we got), but Ignatieff is almost certain to force an election in the fall.

Given this, I would take it one step further, and argue that the rational play for Harper would be to strike a deal with the NDP or Bloc. The drawback there is the high cost (political cost, not monetary cost…what’s another 1 or 2 billion at this point?) associated with the deal, given the harsh words we’ve seen over the past year. I mean, I’m already relishing the idea of posts titled “Harper’s separatist coalition“, or “Gilles Duceppe looked in the mirror and saw Stephane Dion“.

So, for any deal to happen, the “humiliation cost” would need to be less than the “electoral cost” of going to the polls. Or, failing that, if the Bloc or NDP could milk enough out of Harper such that the “results of people/Quebecers benefit” outweighs the “humiliation cost”, it might be in their best interests to deal.

So, the long and short of it is this: if we do see a deal to keep this parliament alive past Christmas, it won’t be with the Liberals, and the payoff will be a whole lot more than a blue ribbon committee.


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